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Abstract 
The epithets “Arab” and “Muslim” are often confused and, in the mind of many Americans, they 
expressly mean the same. In reality, they do not even overlap. Actually, although they have become 
more visible over the past few decades, Arab Americans remain an inadequately described community. 
The first challenge in studying them poses the problem of determining their size. The non-availability of 
official census data, added to contrasted estimates provided by nongovernmental institutions, makes it 
more difficult to draw an accurate statistical picture of such a tiny but extremely diverse group.  
This paper seeks to explore the thorny issue of Arab American identity. It aims to track the paths of two 
communities, Arab American Christians and Muslims, that self-identify as “Arabs”, but differ in many 
respects as to the way they adjust to mainstream society and respond to the stumbling blocks 
encountered on their way for assimilation. It basically aims to demonstrate how, despite inherited 
sectarian frictions, both groups succeeded in recent history to cross faith lines and to constitute 
themselves as a cohesive ethnic entity in the United States. At the same time, it delegitimizes claims that 
the group named “Arab American” is a monolith, and demonstrates that, contrary to popular 
assumptions, the two labels, “Arab” and “American”, are not mutually exclusive. 
Keywords 
Arab Americans, Arab Christians, Arab Muslims, ethnicity, identity, racial classification, 
misconceptions, Islamism 
 
1. Introduction  
Very often, Arabs and Muslims are being stereotyped as belonging to each other‟s group. In the United 
States, where Arab Muslims constitute roughly one-third of the Arab American population and barely a 
quarter of the bulk of American Muslims, a widespread misperception of both communities still 
persists among many Americans who wrongly conflate the two groups and continue to use both labels, 
“Arab” and “Muslim”, interchangeably. 
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So, just as Muslims in the Arab world assume America is a Christian nation, many Americans assume 
all Arabs are Muslims. At the global level, recent headcount reveals that, contrary to popular belief, 
Arabs (originating mainly from North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and Southwest Asia) stand for 
only 20 percent of Muslims worldwide, with a sweeping majority based in South and Southwest Asia 
(in countries like Indonesia, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh) (Note 1).  
This paper seeks to address the thorny issue of Arab American identity. It draws upon the quintessential 
experiences of two communities that self-identify as Arabs, but are utterly different as to the way they 
interact with the mainstream society. It aims to explore how, despite traditional and sectarian 
boundaries, Arab American Christians and Muslims succeeded, over the last few decades, to cross faith 
lines and to constitute themselves as a cohesive ethnic group in the United States. The study conversely 
suggests, how, by no means a life binding pledge, the long sought ethno-political solidarity has often 
been the subject of extreme internal and external tensions that catapulted their communities into the 
national spotlight and further deepened their marginalization. 
The present investigation is articulated around three major developments. First, it introduces both 
groups, Arab Christians and Muslims, and traces their history back to the arrival of the first Arab 
cohorts in the 1880s. It shows how, unlike early immigrants who were mostly Christians and who 
immediately assimilated into the mainstream society, the second and third waves, that respectively 
disembarked in the 1950s/1960s and 1970s/1980s, were mostly Muslims who were more inclined to 
preserve their Arab culture, especially their Islamic identity. 
Second, while it deflects the incorrect equation of Islam with “Arabness”, the inquiry delves into the 
controversial issue of Arab American identity, and tempts to elucidate a number inaccuracies related to 
the label “Arab American”. It demonstrates how, far from forming a monolithic entity, Arab Americans 
are ethnically, religiously and politically diverse. So, like other mainstream communities, they have 
multiple and competing identities that not only shape the way they interact with their fellow citizens, 
but also their political discourse and activism. It suggests, ultimately, that the epithet “Arab” is nothing 
more than a cultural, linguistic, and to certain extents, political designation. 
Third, the research spotlights the major global developments, subsequent to the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, notably the advent of radical Islam. It investigates their repercussions across the 
Atlantic, especially how they resonated on Arab Americans. Incidentally, the growing shift, on the one 
hand, from Arab to Muslim identity, perceived among an augmenting number of young disenchanted 
Muslims, and the growing concern, on the other hand, discernible among certain Arab American 
Christians who feared their loyalty to the United States might be compromised by their close 
association with their Muslim peers, might lead to an inexorable identity crisis, and probably signal the 
end of unity among Arab Americans across religious lines. 
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2. Why “Arab” and “Muslim” Are Not Synonymous 
2.1 Arab Immigration to the U.S. 
The Great Migration to the United States (1880-1924) did not only bring about Europeans and Asians 
in search for a better life, it also drove cohorts of Arab immigrants who successively crossed the Ocean 
in small groups. Actually, Arab immigration to the New World came in three waves. The first, which 
started as early as the 1880s, brought groups of immigrants from the Greater Syria province of the 
Ottoman Empire which, at the time, comprised modern day Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan. 
Most were single, poor, and uneducated Christians who had no intention to settle permanently in the 
host country. The question remains then why most arrivals were Christians. Some researchers point out 
that, in addition to lack of funds to pay for the passage, some Muslims feared they would be unable to 
preserve their heritage in an overwhelmingly Christian environment (Note 2). As noticed by famous 
Arab American historian, Alixa Naff, who asserted: “for Muslims, loyalty to an Islamic ruler, even one 
perceived as inept or cruel, was critical if Islam was to remain unified and if it was to withstand 
inimical Western Christian influences. Arab Christians on the other hand, exposed to and protected by 
the Christian West, attributed the decline of Arab culture to the backwardness of Islam and its Turkish 
rulers” (Note 3). 
Notwithstanding, while it is feasible to estimate their number (roughly 200,000 by 1924), it is almost 
impossible to know exactly how many Arab immigrants entered the United States during that period. 
This is due to diverse factors. Besides the non-availability of recorded data from the village/town of 
origin about leaving cohorts, poor annotation by American officials, especially the various ways they 
classified this group (“Greek”, “Armenian”, “Turk”, “Ottoman”, “African”, “Asian”, etc.), reinforced 
their invisibility and marginalization. So, unlike, for instance, Italian, Irish, or Jewish immigrants who 
formed cohesive ethnic communities upon their arrival in the United States, Arab settlers had rather to 
wait until the 1960s just to self-identify as Arab Americans (Note 4). 
Regardless of problems of identification affecting the early Arab stock, their number continued to 
increase exponentially until 1917 when the federal government, under social and economic pressure, 
took drastic measures against new arrivals from non-European countries. In effect, between 1977 and 
1924, the U.S. Congress passed several laws in that sense, including the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act 
of 1924 which established a quota system that severely restricted immigration from all countries except 
northern and western Europe. As to Arab immigrants, referred to, since 1899, as “Syrian”, their number 
dropped to only 100 people per year (Note 5). In 1940, their overall number was estimated between 
200,000 and 350,000 (Note 6). 
The second wave of Arab immigrants to the U.S. (1950s-1960s) began after World War II and differed 
in many respects from the previous one. Dissimilar to earlier groups, most of the new arrivals were 
literate, qualified, and bilingual Muslims (about 70 percent) who came from across the Middle East, 
namely Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Interestingly, they poured from 
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independent nations and shared a strong sense of ethnic pride and political awareness. If some came 
from middle class backgrounds, fleeing political turmoil and “intra-Arab” conflicts, others were 
ordinary students seeking higher education in American universities (Note 7). According to Gregory 
Orfalea, in his renowned volume, The Arab Americans: A History, from 1948 until 1966, 80,000 Arab 
immigrants entered the United States, many of whom were Palestinian refugees displaced by the 1948 
Arab-Israeli War (Note 8). 
The third wave of Arab arrivals (1970s-present) sparked a significant influx of both Muslim and 
Christian newcomers, especially after the United States had changed its immigration policy in the 
mid-1960s. Actually, the 1965 Immigration Act (also known as the Hart-Cellar Act) which ended all 
restrictions based on national origin, gave way to a massive exodus of diverse flows from regions 
devastated by long wars (Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon). Between 1967 and 2003, some 757,626 men and 
women of Arab descent arrived in the U.S., nearly eleven times the number of immigrants during the 
second wave (Note 9). Huge numbers came as refugees, subsequent to the First Gulf War in the 1990s, 
but many poured from countries like Sudan and Somalia escaping wars and starvation.  
Finally, contrary to popular belief, the number of Arab immigrants to the U.S. did not dwindle after the 
9/11 attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Arab influx continued at 
the same pace, leveling off at around four percent of the overall number of new residents (Note 10). 
According to Randa A. Kayyali, in her survey, “The People Perceived as a Threat to Security”, what 
has substantially dropped, since the 9/11 tragedy, was in fact the number of tourists, students, and 
temporary workers from Arab-speaking countries whom she called “nonimmigrants” (70 percent 
between 2000 and 2004). As a result of tough measures taken by the federal government, especially the 
USA PATRIOT Act (2001) (Note 11), the number of student visas slumped from 19,696 in 2000 to 
6,826 in 2004, a decrease of 65.3 percent (Note 12). 
2.2 How They Are Counted 
Although the label “Arab American” is often used in the empirical data gathered about them, it remains 
widely misunderstood. Who is and is not Arab? Who are American Muslims? Are all Arab Americans 
Muslim? Are all American Muslims Arab? How do Arab Americans self-identify? How does the U.S. 
Census Bureau classify them as an ethno-racial category? What role do nongovernmental institutions, 
namely the Arab American Institute, play in providing reliable information that complement and/or 
readjust official statistics concerning this group? These and other questions need to be answered to 
depict a clear of who Arab Americans really are. 
Because they neither immigrated from a nation-state like, for instance, the Italian or the Polish, nor did 
they have that sense of national consciousness, necessary to hold them together as a monolithic group, 
early Arab immigrants who arrived circa the turn of the 20
th
 century, were difficult to identify, let alone 
to study or investigate. As a result, the use of the term “Arab” became problematic, not only for federal 
officials in charge of collecting data about new arrivals, but also for Arab cohorts themselves who did 
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not use that label to self-identify. So, regardless of their ethnic, linguistic, or religious make up, and 
because they were natives of the Ottoman-colonized Levant, early Arab pioneers were registered as 
originating from “Turkey in Asia”. The term “Arab” was only used to refer to Arab-speaking 
immigrants (Note 13). 
The first Arab encounter with racial classification centered round the question of citizenship. Even 
though they were by no means singled out as a group in the midst of a sweeping nativist wave targeting 
Catholics, Jews, and non-European groups in general, Arab immigrants had every now and then to 
confront court challenges to their right to citizenship. Interestingly, the decision to fold Arab Americans 
in the “Caucasian race” and to grant them the American citizenship, as early as 1880, was not based on 
strict scientific or “biological” criteria. Rather, it stemmed from inconsistent and often arbitrary court 
rulings with little or no knowledge of the Arab world. Arabs were defined as “person(s) having origins 
in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa” (Note 14). As to the U.S. 
Census Bureau, it simply did not consider “Arab” as a racial category, like “White”, “Black”, or 
“Asian”. 
In December 1909, Arab immigrants (now referred to as Syrians) had to confront their first challenge 
that questioned their “whiteness”, and therefore their eligibility for citizenship, after a 23 year-old 
Syrian immigrant, named Costa George Najour, appeared in Atlanta‟s Circuit Court to hear argument 
related to his petition to become an American citizen. The court questioned whether Syrians‟ birthplace 
(Turkey in Asia) and his racial appearance qualified him for the white race, notably that the 1870 
statute considered as white, among foreign-born applicants, only persons who were either “free white 
persons” or of “African nationality or descent”. The case was finally overturned on appeal, recognizing 
that Syrians were Caucasian and therefore eligible for citizenship (Note 15). 
In 1914, a federal court in South Carolina re-launched the whiteness/citizenship controversy. It ruled 
that Syrians might be free white persons, but they were not “that particular free white person(s) to 
whom act of Congress (1790) had donated the privilege of citizenship”, a privilege conceded primarily 
to people of European descent. Again, the case was invalidated in 1915 upon appeal on the basis that 
“physically the modern Syrians are of mixed, Arabian and even Jewish blood. They belong to the 
Semitic branch of Caucasian race, thus widely differing from their rulers, the Turks who are in origin 
Mongolian” (Note 16). 
Interestingly, each time they were faced with the threat of losing their citizenship rights in a context of 
white supremacy, Arab Americans demonstrated a staunch determination to battle for their white racial 
status, even sometimes at the cost of jeopardizing their ethno-religious unity. Some Arab Christians, for 
instance, in addition to their economic success which they branded as an undeniable sign of their 
assimilation, went so far as to play the religious card to offer evidence of their adaptability to a culture 
so heavily infused with Christian moral superiority, a card that definitely could not be played by their 
Muslim counterparts (Note 17). In 1909, for instance, H. E. Halaby (a person of Arab-Christian 
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background) wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times in which he argued: “The Syrians are 
very proud of their ancestry, and believe that the Caucasian race had its origin in Syria, that they 
opened the commerce of the world, and that Christ, our Savior, was born among them, in which fact the 
Syrians take high pride” (Note 18). By the same token and in the same year, a Lebanese-Syrian 
policeman (George Shishem), seeking citizenship, challenged the Department of Justice‟s claim that, 
based on his faith, he was part of the “Mongoloid” race. He contended: “If I am Mongolian, then so 
was Jesus, because we came from the same land”, an assertion upon which the Los Angeles Superior 
Court overruled the Department‟s decision, recognizing acknowledging Shishem‟s religious appeal to 
whiteness (Note 19). 
Still and all, while it granted them unquestionable legal and social advantages, as now they were 
recognized as an integral part of the white majority, Arab Americans have become increasingly aware 
of the pressuring need to redefine their identity to form an ethnically identifiable community. For, in 
addition to the fact that they were not officially recognized as a federal minority group, their 
classification by the U.S. Census Bureau as Caucasian/White by race served only to weaken any sense, 
among them, of group solidarity, and further reinforced their invisibility and dislocation. As a 
consequence, not only they became one of the least studied communities in most group-centered 
surveys and investigations, but also a significantly undercounted community. 
Today, according to the 2010 Census, there are 1,967,570 persons in the United States who reported an 
Arab ancestry, a figure considered by the Arab American Institute (Note 20) and Zogby International as 
significantly lower than the actual number which they estimate at 3,665,389. As a matter of fact, the 
U.S. Census Bureau does not provide any Arab classification option, nor does it request religious 
affiliation. Instead, federal data on Arab Americans are derived from a question on ancestry (Note 21), 
a question which appeared for the first time in the 1980 decennial census, and to which surveyed 
individuals responded by listing a predominantly Arabic-speaking country or area of the world as their 
place of origin. As indicated in Table One, 290,893 persons self-identified as “Arab” and originating 
principally from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Morocco, and a further 224,241 as 
“Other Arabs”, with reference to those tracing their roots to countries such as Algeria, Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (Note 22).  
To the Arab American Institute, officially mandated to collaborate with the U.S. Census Bureau as its 
only Census Information Center (CIC) and advocate on behalf of the Arab American community, the 
undercount stems from an inaccurate definition of the label “Arab” that markedly differs from the one 
provided by the Arab League (Note 23). For them, the American Community Survey (Note 24) 
identifies only a portion of the Arab population through the question of “ancestry”. For instance, they 
do not include Arab-speaking populations originating from countries like Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, 
Mauritania and the Comoros (see Figure 1) (Note 25). So, as demonstrated in Table 1, the number of 
Americans who claim an Arab ancestry grew by more than 72 percent between 2000 and 2010, and 
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more than doubled since 1980. According to the Arab American Institute, it is one However, regardless 
of their exact size, the Arab American population is an enormously diverse community that traces 
ancestral ties to 22 countries, and comprises a highly heterogeneous amalgam of groups with varying 
historical origins and religious backgrounds, but sharing a common cultural and linguistic heritage that 
gives them a unifying Arab American identity. of the fastest growing Arab diasporas in the world (Note 
26).  
 
 
Figure 1. Arab American Population 
Source: 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates—U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
Furthermore, contrary to what is conveyed about them in mainstream media that often portray them as 
foreign-born, the majority of Arab Americans, today, are native-born with nearly 82 percent who are 
full-fledged citizens of the United States (Note 27).  
 
Table 1. Arab Americans in the 2000-2010 Census 
Ancestry 2000 2000 (% of US population) 2010 2010 (% of US population) 
 Lebanese 440,279 0.2% 501,988 % 
 Syrian 142,897 0.1% 148,214 % 
 Egyptian 142,832 0.1% 190,078 % 
 Palestinian 72,096 0.04% 93,438 % 
 Jordanian 39,734 0.03% 61,664 % 
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 Moroccan 38,923 0.03% 82,073 % 
 Iraqi 37,714 0.01% 105,981 % 
 Yemeni 11,654 0.005% 29,358  % 
 Algerian 8,752 % 14,716 % 
 Saudi 7,419 % 
 
% 
 Tunisian 4,735 % 
 
% 
 Kuwaiti 3,162 % 
 
% 
 Libyan 2,979 % 
 
% 
 Emirati 459 % 
 
% 
 Omani 351 % 
 
% 
“North African” 3,217 % 
 
% 
“Arabs” 85,151 % 290,893 % 
“Arabic” 120,665 % 
 
% 
Other Arabs 
 
% 224,241 % 
TOTAL 1,160,729 TOTAL 1,697,570 % 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2010). 
 
Confusion over who is and is not “Arab” is made even worse when we add the religious element. The 
palpable lack of knowledge of this community, coupled with a group stigma that associates them with 
Arabs in the Middle East and Islamic fundamentalism, further complicates their endeavor to clear any 
misconception about them, and renders the distinction between the two designators, “Arab” and 
“Muslim”, quite impossible. Actually, very few among their fellow citizens realize that, worldwide, 
only about 20 percent of Muslims are of an Arab descent (from the Middle East and North Africa), and 
more than 60 percent of the global Muslim population are based in Asia, in countries like Indonesia 
(more than 202 million), Pakistan (more than 174 million), India (more than 160 million), and 
Bangladesh (more than 145 million) (See Figure 2) (Note 28).  
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Figure 2. Estimated 2009 Muslim Population 
Source: Pew Research Center (October, 2009). 
 
At the national level, once again and contrary to popular assumptions, not only Arab Americans 
constitute a minority among American Muslims, in general, but also within their respective community. 
According to recent estimates by the Pew Research Center, there are 3.3 million Muslims living in the 
United States, representing roughly one percent of the total American population (Note 29). In a similar 
vein, a 2009 Gallup poll reveals that American Muslims are one of the most racially diverse groups in 
the country, with African-American making more than a quarter of the overall Muslim population (Note 
30). According, finally, to the U.S. Department of State (see Figure 3), American Muslims claiming an 
Arab origin stand for only 26 percent of American Muslims as a whole, compared with Asian 
Americans (34 percent) and Afro-Americans (25 percent) (Note 31). 
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Figure 3. American Muslim Ethnic Distribution 
Source: U.S. Department of State (Recent). 
 
Last but not least, although the Muslim component is growing fast in the United States, Christians 
constitute an overwhelming majority of Arab Americans. A 2002 Zogby International survey suggests 
that 63 percent of this group are Christian, 24 percent Muslim, and 13 percent who either identify with 
another religion or simply do not practice any faith at all (see Figure 4) (Note 32). Conversely, while 
Arab American Christians are divided between Eastern churches (Orthodox) and Latin rite churches 
(Maronite, Melkite, and Chaldean), most Arab American Muslims belong to one of the two main 
branches of Islam: Sunni and Shi‟a (Note 33). Druze is another Muslim denomination originating 
mostly from Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. 
 
 
Figure 4. Arab American Religions 
Source: Zogby International Institute Survey (2002). 
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3. White without Privilege 
Currently, the group known as “Arab Americans” is situated at an interesting crossroads where the 
framing of a cohesive ethnic identity has become a matter of utmost necessity. Besides the fact that the 
federal agencies have often preferred to deal with individuals and groups identifiable in ethnic terms, 
Arab Americans realized that their “White” status could not sufficiently protect them against the 
anti-Arab/Muslim prejudice that accompanied the influx of Muslim immigrants, after 1965, and that 
gained ground following the 9/11 attacks. They understood that they needed more than racial 
homogenization to secure their future as full American citizens. First and foremost, they needed to 
redefine their identity across religious and sectarian lines, and notably form a defense mechanism that 
articulates their singularity as a distinct group, rather than a neglected segment of the white majority. 
As clearly asserted by Arab American specialist, Alixa Naff, who observed: “One of the most prevailing 
themes in Arab American writings is that they are a group who „became white‟ but who currently do not 
reap the benefits of „whiteness‟” (Note 34). 
In a similar vein, numerous Arab American leaders and experts refuted any perceptible advantage from 
the “White” status, and argued that Arab racialization further amplified their invisibility and resulted in 
a skewed understanding of who they really were. For, unlike, for instance, Asian Americans, Arab 
Americans could not be racially identified, as the attribute “Arab” referred to a cultural ethnicity rather 
than to a racial category. More importantly, the close association, in public discourse, of Arab 
Americans with the Islamic religion, according to them, further alienated them as the “Other”, and 
preempted them in a “not quite white” or “honorary white” subdivision. In this respect, Sawsan 
Abdulrahim contended: “Nonetheless, the demonizing of Arabs and Muslims, which began well before 
September 11, 2001, is part of a dynamic process of racialization that ought to be understood in the 
context of race history of the United States and, what is more important, challenged” (Note 35). 
It is worth to emphasize, in this context, that throughout their history, Arab Americans have often been 
subjected to a “shifting color line”, arbitrarily fixed and incessantly morphed by American courts. As a 
consequence, not only their changing racial classifications were fraught with inaccuracies pertaining to 
their number, but they also hindered any scholarly investigation about their group, leaving the ground 
free for media stereotyping and vilification. Most of all, Arab Americans demonstrated a firm resolve to 
claim their minority status, as they came to discover they had much to gain from achieving such an 
attribute, than remain categorized as “Caucasian”. 
In January 2012, to partly counter mounting discrimination against Arab Americans, but also to derive 
economic benefits accorded to underprivileged ethnic groups, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee (ADC) (Note 36) took the initiative to file a petition with the United States Department of 
Commerce, precisely its Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA), to qualify for 
“disadvantaged minority” status. Expectedly, such an asset would not only provide tangible economic 
advantages, as it would favorably position Arab American entrepreneurs, but would also grant them 
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unrestricted access to lucrative government contracts (Note 37). ADC‟s initiative was equally meant to 
challenge the legal designation of Arab Americans as “Whites” and create a new category on U.S. 
Census that comprises MENA‟s (Middle East and North Africa) populations (Note 38). 
In sum, talking about an all-embracing consensus on the minority status across the Arab American 
community would be devoid of any substance, namely that a significant number among its members, 
notably Christians, suspect that such an initiative is likely to deprive them of the privileges of 
“whiteness” which they clearly relate to their Christianity. In other words, some Arab American 
Christians (especially among the assimilated stock) are reluctant to leverage their “Caucasian” status 
for certain utilitarian gains which seem more likely, in a context of war on terror, to benefit their newly 
established Muslim peers than themselves. As stressed by Arab American expert, Khaled A. Beydoun, 
who points out: “the cost of winning minority status—for many assimilated Arabs—is the whiteness and 
accompanying privilege American courts granted them, and rejected others, over the last century” 
(Note 39). Actually, while he laments Arab Americans‟ inability to follow the footsteps of their Jewish 
counterparts who, thanks to an exceptional sense of group solidarity, succeeded ultimately in 
surmounting obstacles posited by their religion, Beydoun harshly criticizes part of the Christian 
component who, instead of standing side by side with their Muslim peers, singled out as the “other” 
after the September 11 tragedy, preferred rather to “re-leverage religion as a marker of whiteness and 
patriotism”, and use their Christianity as a “trump card for inclusion in halls of power denied to 
Arab-American Muslims who rejected tokenization as a means for overcoming de facto 
Islamophobia-quotas in public and private hiring” (Note 40). Beydoun finally substantiates his 
argument with a claim by Mouaz Mustafa, a political consultant in Washington, D.C., who contended: 
“We‟re American and Arab, not Muslim, is what I heard… Many Arab Christians overcompensated by 
being hyper-Islamophobic” (Note 41). 
 
4. The Evolution of Arab American Identity 
Achieving minority status at the cost of “whiteness” incontestably granted Arab Americans certain 
legal and economic prerogatives, but by no means was this sufficient to enhance group solidarity 
beyond the racial context. Actually, Arab Americans became aware that to compensate for the race 
deficit and to defend the community‟s vital interests, they needed more than self-perception. Principally, 
they needed to set up common goals that not only obscure their internal differences, but also surmount 
barriers pertaining to their extreme diversity. They became conscious that sharing a common linguistic 
and cultural heritage was not enough to cultivate a new Arab American identity that promotes their 
group and challenges their status as “ambiguous outsiders” (Note 42). They also came to realize that to 
consolidate their ethnic features, they had to endeavor for the creation of a new framework that would 
rally their disparate communities around central issues that could only be addressed through political 
mobilization. As lucidly captured by Gary C. David, in his insightful article, “The Creation of „Arab 
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American‟: Political Activism and Ethnic (Dis)Unity”: “Just as geological pressure can transform coal 
into a diamond, social pressure can transform a diverse ethnic community into a unified social and 
political force” (Note 43). 
But the formation of a pan-Arab ethnic identity is a very long and complicated process, as Arab 
Americans had first to relinquish some of their traditional and sectarian bonds, especially ties with the 
ancestral homeland that naturally declined with acculturation. How to bridge the gap between two 
sub-communities, the assimilated Christian stock who showed little interest in political mobilization, 
and the newly-settled cohorts (those who arrived after World War Two) who were overwhelmingly 
Muslim, highly educated and eminently politicized? How to construct an ideological core and seek 
support for a political agenda that defends Arab Americans‟ interests, regardless of their religious and 
national backgrounds? How to form an entirely novel identity that transcends group diversity and paves 
the ground for the emergence of an ethnic minority with the political label “Arab American”? These 
and other interrogations posed more than a challenge to Arab American leaders who, in such 
circumstances, had no alternative but to define a clear vision for the future their community, and set up 
a judicious political strategy that would secure their rights as the members of a distinct ethnic group, 
and more importantly as full American citizens. 
However, taking into account the extreme group diversity, the discernible disinterest in political 
activism, namely the lack of consensus around common goals, one would gauge only an extraordinary 
event would have to take place to change the course of history for a community that had been still 
looking for a sense of purpose. The 1967 Arab-Israel War, in that respect, not only signaled the advent 
of a new era in Arab American history, but also provided a strong catalyst for a collective and 
large-scale political action that crossed faith lines and stressed the value of “being an Arab” above all 
other attributes. Actually, Arab Americans could hardly understand the unequivocal support shown by 
their fellow citizens to the Jewish state and, at the same time, the degree of “Arab” vilification across 
mainstream media and within the American political discourse. “What resonated the most in the minds 
of many Arab Americans”, commented Gary C. David, “was not only the quick victory by Israel, but 
the out-right support given to Israel by the United States government, the mass media, and the public” 
(Note 44). 
To renowned scholar and Arab American Muslim expert, Yvonne Y. Haddad, the 1967 Six-Day War 
basically brought to visibility a group of people that, so far, had lived at the periphery of mainstream 
society and had often been marginalized in scholarly research and social studies. She observed: “It was 
the advent of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 that new meaning came to be attached to the term 
Arab-American. The specific experiences of Arabs in the United States became the subject of study 
analysis by a number of Arab intellectuals” (Note 45). 
Interestingly, the manifestation of the group acceptance of a new ethnic identity came as a reaction to 
anti-Arab bias. But Arab Americans found also common ground in the Palestinian cause which 
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enhanced, among them, a new sense of political engagement, and chiefly served as a linchpin to unify 
their ranks and galvanize their energies. Most of all, it demonstrated that the group, now named “Arab 
Americans”, was by no means a rigid monolith, but rather a fluid and dynamic ethnicity. It became 
evident, according to Ozdil Zehni, that “Arab American identity was no longer dormant and 
amorphous. Arab Americans had become an integral American minority group” (Note 46). 
Put in a wider context, the emergence of ethno-political activism among Arab Americans could partly 
be attributed to Arab nationalism, or pan-Arabism, a political movement that had swept through the 
Arab World in the 1950s and 1960s (Note 47). Many Arab Americans joined to adopt an Arab 
nationalist stance, as probably for the first time, they realized how challenging it was for them to 
reconcile their Arab identity with their American one. But to some Arab specialists, namely famous 
scholar, Michael W. Suleiman, the burgeoning political consciousness among Arab Americans was, in 
large measure, due to the presence of a new cohort of “politically sophisticated” immigrants who not 
only injected new blood into a nascent group awareness, but also brought about a new sense of purpose 
to a community that for so long had lived at the margin of American mainstream society, despite its 
acculturation (Note 48). 
Concomitant with the advent of political activism, in the late 1960s, was the emergence of Arab 
American national organizations with a clear goal, not to lobby for an “Arab” political agenda, but 
rather to combat anti-Arab discrimination and negative stereotyping at home and to advance the 
Palestinian cause at the foreign policy level. Arab American advocacy groups were, in fact, established 
as ventilation of a new spirit that aimed to embrace community interests, regardless of any national or 
religious consideration. None was oriented on religion, as, according to Yvonne Haddad, they 
“appealed to a sense of shared history and a common destiny in the United States. They transcended 
religious and sectarian differences as their membership included concerned people of all faith 
communities” (Note 49). Among the most influential, we can cite the Association of Arab-American 
University Graduates (AAUG) which was formed in 1967, the National Association of Arab-Americans 
(NAAA) which had been active between 1972 and 2002, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee (ADC) founded in 1980 by former Arab American federal Senator, James Abourezk, and 
the Arab American Institute (AAI) established in 1985 by Dr. James Zogby and headquartered in 
Washington, D.C. 
 
5. Shift from Arab to Muslim Identity 
The new political awareness that fashioned the Arab American identity brought focus and intensity to a 
disparate community, but by no means precluded immunity from dislocation, as the group, now named 
“Arab American”, unquestionably made tangible progress in the sense of self-perception and political 
maturation, but pressures facing its survival have not changed in essence over the years. The 1980s, in 
this regard, not only marked a turning-point in the history of group unity and cohesion, more 
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importantly, it confronted the community with its first major identity crisis. Actually, with the global 
rise of radical Islam, subsequent to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, it became question for Arab 
Americans to redefine their identity, notably that an increasing number among its disenchanted Muslim 
youth started to manifest a growing shift away from Arab to Islamic identity (Note 50). As perceptively 
anticipated by Khalil Jahshan, the executive director of the National Association of Arab Americans 
(NAAA) who predicted: “The next few years belong to the Islamists... Arab Americans lack the 
cementing factors” (Note 51). 
While it was premature, at the time, to come to definite conclusions about any utter group 
disintegration, the shift from a secular to a religious identity laid bare deep-seated frictions between 
Arab American Christians and Muslims, and signaled an outright return to pre-1960s sectarian and 
national antagonisms. Exacerbated by nationwide campaigns in the media, stigmatizing Arabs and 
Muslims as the “Other”, divisions between the culturally assimilated Christians who always felt more 
“American” than “Arab”, and the newly-settled Muslims who clang tenaciously to their Islamic identity, 
started to demarcate the two groups. It became increasingly obvious that, beyond a common cultural 
heritage and an endeavor to promote the Palestinian cause, both sub-communities did not principally 
share much else, as they “did not necessarily live in the same neighborhoods or frequent the same 
social settings” (Note 52).  
The polemic over “Arab” or “Muslim” identity further polarized the two components of the Arab 
American community and intensified internal dissensions, with each group claiming more ethnic 
legitimacy. The “row” reached its apex after the 9/11 tragedy that sharply marked an end to four 
decades of secular ethnic unity, and seriously called into question the tremendous efforts vested by both 
Arab Christians and Muslims to reach consensus and group unison. The terrorist attacks laid bare the 
evidence that joining efforts to fighting against discrimination and promoting the Palestinian cause, as 
the top priorities of a common “Arab” agenda, did not prove a sufficiently strong group mobilizer. 
Interestingly, while both experienced cultural marginalization, regardless of their religious identity, 
Arab American Christians and Muslims coped with the new post-9/11 context differently. If, to distance 
themselves from the Arab/Muslim stigma, Arab Christians chose to break with their ethnicity in favor 
of an all-encompassing adoption of the mainstream culture, their Muslim peers simply decided to 
retreat into ethnic enclaves, stressing their Arab and Muslim identity above all and everything. The 
massive influx of Arab Christian immigrants fleeing persecution in some Arab countries (Copts from 
Egypt, Assyrians from Iraq and Syria, etc.), over the past decades, added to the group disintegration, 
and fuelled fears about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism discernible among a growing number of 
Arab American Muslim youth, designated by some tabloid-style media as “Generation Islam”. 
It is worth noting, in the same vein, that from the outset, Arab American Christians and Muslims did 
not evolve in the same neighborhoods, nor did they cohabit in the same social settings. As a result, both 
groups have developed conflicting views about how they should adjust to the mainstream society, and 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/wjssr             World Journal of Social Science Research                 Vol. 3, No. 3, 2016 
 
453 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
often embraced incongruous attitudes as to how self-identify. For instance, while Arab Muslims stress 
“Arabness” as a principal requisite to Arab legitimacy, their Christian counterparts claim that they are 
Americans who happen to be of Arab ancestry. Caught in the midst of a ravaging vilification campaign 
that swept Muslims and non-Muslims alike, some Arab American Christians simply disengaged from 
their ethnic identity, assuming that they should not carry a burden that was not theirs to carry. 
Socially speaking, while Arab American Christians could easily hide their cultural heritage, exhibiting 
conspicuous signs of their Christianity, like for instance “anglicizing” their names, wearing big crosses, 
attending the Sunday mass with other “mainstream” American, etc., Arab American Muslims, by 
contrast, could hardly hide their Islamic identity, especially their Islamic rituals (five daily prayers, the 
wearing of beards for men and the headscarf for women, etc.) which make of them a visible community, 
hence a frequently targeted one. Added to that, the recent global mutations, namely the war on terror, 
the ongoing civil war in Syria, the rise of ISIS or the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant, tightened the 
grip around this community, deemed unfit within the American ethno-religious mosaic. “We‟re on a 
double edge sword here”, contended Osama Siblani, founder of the Dearborn-based (Note 53) 
newspaper, Arab American News, “There is a general fear in our community that has increased. We are 
victimized twice. We are victimized as Americans and freedom-loving people and we are victims as 
Muslims and Arabs. Now you can‟t mourn as an American, you have to justify. You have to retake your 
oath of citizenship. You have to dig up your ancestry. Some of my ancestors came here in the late 1800s. 
We are part of this great country. That‟s what hurts” (Note 54).  
The sentiment of cultural marginalization is prevalent among, for instance, a number of Chaldeans who, 
although they share basic cultural characteristics with Arab Americans, expressly dis-identify with 
them on the basis that they are neither Muslim nor Arab. Put into another context, a Christian Lebanese 
student, for instance, shares very little with an Arab Muslim classmate, and certain Christian pupils of 
Arab ancestry simply hide their ethnic identity and distance themselves from their Muslim peers. Very 
often, some among them, who speak English with a native accent, feel disconcerted to have their 
parents encounter schoolmates and school officials. 
Seen through the lens of patriotic loyalty and political trustworthiness, the diagnosis appears much 
more alarming. According to recent surveys, a substantial number of polled Americans continue to 
believe that American Muslims comprise a monolithic minority ill-suited to participation in American 
democracy, that Muslims in general privilege their Muslim identity over their other concerns, and that 
religion is the driving force behind all their political attitudes and behavior. Consistent with this, a 2015 
Zogby International poll revealed that a sizeable portion of American respondents doubted the ability of 
Arab Americans and American Muslims to perform an important position of influence in the 
government. For instance, 35 percent of surveyed people felt that Arab Americans would be influenced 
by their ethnicity, and 46 percent felt that American Muslims would be influenced by their religion (See 
Table 2) (Note 55). Overall, the survey results suggested that there had been a continued erosion in the 
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favorable ratings Americans had of Arabs (40 percent in 2010 against 40 percent in 2015), and Muslims 
(48 percent against 33 percent respectively) (Note 56).  
 
Table 2. Arab Americans and American Muslims Working in Government 
If an Arab/Muslim American were to attain an important position of influence in the government, 
would you feel confident that person would be able to do the job, or would you feel that any 
ethnic/religious loyalty would influence their decision-making? 
Group Response 2010 2014 2015 
Arab Americans 
Confident they could do the job. 42 36 37 
Their ethnicity would influence their decision-making. 32 36 35 
American Muslims 
Confident they could do the job. 38 34 31 
Their ethnicity would influence their decision-making. 38 42 46 
Source: Zogby Analytics (December 21, 2015). 
 
On the whole, while some observers attribute the growing animosity against Arabs and Muslims to the 
rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the ensuing vague of terrorist attacks across the Western world, 
others highlight the lack of knowledge of the above-mentioned groups as an additional factor shaping 
attitudes toward them. For example, a majority of respondents, in the same survey, say they feel they do 
not know enough about Arab history and people (54 percent), or about Islam and Muslims (47 percent) 
(Note 57). Significantly, evidence of this lack of knowledge comes from the fact that a sizable number 
among Americans wrongly conflate the two communities. This is at least what one can deduce from a 
previous poll by Zogby Analytics (2014) which gives substance to this reality. In effect, as 
demonstrated in Table 3, 44 percent of polled Americans mistakenly believe that the majority of Arab 
Americans are Muslim (in reality, less than a third are), or that a majority of American Muslims are 
Arab (less than one-quarter are) (Note 58). 
 
Table 3. Ethnicity and Religion 
Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree with the following statements:—The 
majority of Arab Americans are Muslim? 
Response Total Dem Rep Ind 18-29 65+ White Non-white 
Agree 44 41 50 42 43 47 44 43 
Disagree 24 21 28 22 25 23 25 20 
—The majority of American Muslims are Arab? 
Response Total Dem Rep Ind 18-29 65+ White Non-white 
Agree 30 25 40 25 36 27 30 30 
Disagree 33 56 32 30 23 26 34 30 
Source: Zogby Analytics (July 29, 2014). 
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6. Conclusion: Looking Ahead 
On the whole, while it is premature, at this stage, to suggest an irrevocable divide between the two 
components of the Arab American community, Christian and Muslim, as secular Arab American 
organizations continue to collaborate to achieve two chief goals: combatting discrimination and 
promoting the Palestinian cause, one could arguably presume that the road is too long before they 
regain former group cohesion. At the same time, pursuing a modus operandi that narrowly prioritizes 
each group‟s distinctive features, and engaging into a polarizing debate on who is more “Arab” or more 
“American” than the other, would unavoidably accentuate internal divisions and augment the 
community‟s vulnerability. 
On the Christian side, disengaging from the Arab heritage and emphasizing their Christian faith as a 
symbol of their Americanness, proved relatively shortsighted as they discovered that whatever cultural 
concessions they make, they could never attain the “American” identity. As plainly expressed by Ray 
Hanania, a Christian Palestinian American journalist and stand-up comedian, in his famous book, I‟m 
Glad I Look Like a Terrorist: Growing up Arab in America, “We pushed our ethnicity down because we 
wanted dearly to be part of this country. We Changed our names, gave ourselves nicknames, to make it 
easier for Americans to accept us. „Kaffirs, or sub-humans‟; „Discriminated against‟; „Victims of bias 
and stereotyping‟; „Defenseless against the fears and frustrations of society‟. These words have 
meaning to us. No one can really understand the truth of their own ethnicity until they have 
experienced the pains and the joys of another‟s” (Note 59). 
On their part, while it appears legitimate that they defend their minority status, especially their right of 
worship in a multi-faith society, Arab American Muslims should pursue more public engagement and 
work to change the negative perception of Islam among their fellow citizens. Furthermore, 
marginalized as they are within an already marginalized group, they should more than ever endeavor to 
delegitimize claims that there is one kind of Islam and one kind of Muslims characterized by their 
hatred of the West. More importantly, they need to demonstrate that being a Muslim is not the most 
salient identity when it comes to political participation, as pertinently reflected in a nationwide survey 
conducted, in 2007, by the renowned Pew Research Center (Note 60). 
The inquiry revealed that, contrary to popular assumptions, American Muslims as a whole (Note 61) 
are diverse, well-integrated, and largely mainstream in their attitudes, values, and behaviors. For 
instance, when asked about how they felt about their personal identity, nearly half of them (47 percent) 
said they were Muslims “First”, and 28 percent thought of themselves as American “First”, a strikingly 
inferior percentage to that of white evangelicals who identified themselves first by their faith (62 
percent) (Note 62). More than six-in-ten U.S. Muslims (63 percent) saw no conflict between being a 
devout Muslim and living in a modern society. When it came to income and education, American 
Muslims generally mirrored the U.S. public, with roughly a quarter (24 percent) among them who had 
a college degree, and 41 percent reporting household incomes of $50,000 or more annually (against 44 
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percent nationwide). Like other Americans, once again, American Muslims held mixed views about 
political issues. As a matter of fact, 38 percent of respondents described themselves as moderate, 
against only 19 percent who identified as conservatives. They were more likely to affiliate with the 
Democratic Party (63 percent) than with the Republican one (11 percent). Last but not least, though 
Muslims in the U.S. had doubts about the war on terror, the vast majority among them said they were 
either very concerned (51 percent) or somewhat concerned (25 percent) with the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism across the globe (Note 63).   
All in all, in the recent context of increasing Arab and Muslim stigmatization, fuelled by the 
inflammatory rhetoric of some GOP presidential candidates suggesting, amongst others, that all 
Muslims register in “databases”, Arab American Christians and Muslims should, more than ever, 
surmount their internal frictions and mobilize an on-the-ground effort to combat discrimination. 
Moreover, to achieve community goals and avoid cultural extinction, they should consider that both 
identities, “Arab” and “American” are not mutually exclusive, but rather, are expressive of some sort of 
“cultural hybridity” reflecting recent changing social environments. As positively asserted by 
Palestinian American journalist, Ray Hanania, “Perhaps with such efforts, in the future Arab Americans 
will no longer be seen as a small bubble floating apart from the rest of society‟s brew, but rather as an 
important ingredient in the diverse ethnic framework that brings strength to American society” (Note 
64).  
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